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Abstract:
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling (MCOOL) was implemented on seafood in the United
States on April 4, 2005. MCOOL exempts the foodservice sector and excludes processed
seafood from labeling. This paper contributes to understanding the economics of the MCOOL
law for seafood by showing that current partial implementation may have unintended
consequences on the domestic supply chain. While labeling satisfies the market demand for
information provision in one market, exemptions in the other market may create incentives for
the diversion of imports, which are assumed to be lower in quality than domestic seafood, to the
non-labeled sector. Analyzing alternate scenarios such as voluntary labeling shows that total
welfare may be greatest under this scenario compared with partial MCOOL. Voluntary origin
labeling of seafood by some U.S. retailers indicates there is no compelling market failure
argument warranting partial MCOOL implementation. This work is therefore a step towards
analyzing the effect of partial MCOOL policy in the seafood industry taking into consideration
the nature of the industry.
Keywords: Country of origin labeling, product differentiation, information asymmetry, seafood
JEL Classification: L15, L22, Q18
________________________
1
Siny Joseph, Department of Resource Economics
University of Massachusetts, Stockbridge Hall
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9246
E: siny@resecon.umass.edu P: 316-350-4666 F: 413-545-5853
2

Nathalie Lavoie, Department of Resource Economics
University of Massachusetts, 212D Stockbridge Hall
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9246
E: lavoie@resecon.umass.edu P: 413-545-5713 F: 413-545-5853

3

Julie A. Caswell, Department of Resource Economics
University of Massachusetts, 215 Stockbridge Hall
80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9246
E: caswell@resecon.umass.edu P: 413-545-5735 F: 413-545-5853

Partial Implementation of COOL: Economic Effects in the U.S. Seafood Industry
Introduction
The recent spate of incidents with U.S. imports has turned the heat back on the
issue of mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL). Prominent incidents are recalls
of a number of Chinese-made products: farm-raised shrimp and catfish, pet food laced
with contaminated wheat gluten, toothpaste containing diethylene glycol—a poison used
in antifreeze, children's necklaces and earrings, toy trains and popular preschool toys
containing high levels of lead. Barboza (2007) outlines the degraded conditions in which
some seafood for export to United States is farmed in China. The media also reports that
at-risk Chinese seafood shipments that are supposed to be tested for safety are going
unchecked and that FDA personnel “inspect less than 1 percent of all imported food and
conduct laboratory analysis on only a tiny fraction of those (LA Times, 2007;
www.foodandwaterwatch.org).”
At the same time, a food labeling poll conducted by Consumer Reports shows that
consumers want to know where their food comes from and expect higher label standards.
According to the poll, 92 percent of consumers agree that imported foods should be
labeled by their country of origin.
The U.S. Congress implemented MCOOL in the United States in April 2005 for
fish and shellfish. The objective was to communicate to consumers the national origin
and method of production (wild or farm-raised) via mandatory labels. However, the
labels are restricted to fresh and frozen seafood at the retail level. Foodservice
establishments, small retailers and ingredients in processed seafood products are exempt.
1

On one hand, the resulting partial coverage creates a potentially gaping hole possibly
undermining the effectiveness of MCOOL law. On the other hand, is there a market
failure that warrants the implementation of this law? This paper tackles these issues.
The increase in demand for fish and seafood, the growth of cheaper imports of
seafood and particularly the increase in consumption away-from-home, and the partial
implementation of MCOOL imply that a large part of the market is not covered by the
law. According to Hale (2005), restaurants are the key source of seafood, with 60 percent
of consumers reporting they eat more seafood away from home. More specifically
Keithly (1985) estimates that the quantity of away-from-home seafood products
consumed ranges from one-third to two-thirds of all consumption of seafood. The overall
exempt market (retailers not subject to the rule and foodservice establishments) accounts
for 62 percent of fish and 75 percent of shellfish (USDA-AMS, 2004). Stewart et al.
(2004) predict that per capita spending on seafood could rise by 18 percent at full-service
restaurants and by 6 percent for fast food between 2000 and 2020.
Currently, over 70 percent of the seafood Americans consume is imported
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 2007). The significant share of imports in U.S.
seafood consumption raises concern about their safety. In the United States, the use of the
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) system is considered necessary to
ensure quality and safety of seafood. While imports are required to have the same
standards of quality and safety, enforcement may be weaker. HACCP operates in the
context of an extensive set of requirements for good manufacturing practices and sanitary
operating procedures. In addition, there are numerous federal and state regulations that
influence the location and timing of harvest and the choices of aquaculture operations
2

(Caswell, 2006). Products from less developed countries are generally perceived to be of
lower quality than products of developed countries (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999).
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 80 percent of the total imported edible
seafood in 2007 came from less developed countries. Although there is no evidence that
imported seafood is necessarily riskier, a number of countries exporting seafood to the
United States have poorer internal control systems and/or are in tropical areas where
toxin and bacteria hazards are higher. Imports become an issue of concern because
countries vary in their use of vaccines, feed additives, and antibiotics for farm-raised fish
and shellfish (Allshouse et al., 2004).
The objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects for consumers and
sellers with MCOOL implementation for seafood, given that more than 70 percent of
seafood consumed in the United States is imported and most of it (by value) is consumed
in the foodservice sector. MCOOL is a retail labeling program and does not cover the
foodservice sector. As noted above, exemptions and exclusions of MCOOL on covered
seafood products amount to 62 percent fish and 75 percent of shellfish. This effectively
means that most of the imported seafood consumed in United States is not affected by the
MCOOL legislation. The presence of a non-labeled sector raises the possibility of
diversion of lower quality seafood into this sector, which might undermine the
effectiveness of the law. This paper does not consider white table cloth restaurants where
quality and safety of seafood may not be an issue.
To address the economic impact of the MCOOL law in the foodservice and retail
sector, this paper develops a conceptual model that explores diversion of imported
seafood to the non-labeled sector. The model is a variant of the model of vertical product
3

differentiation by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and explicitly accounts for differences in
consumer attitudes towards foreign and domestic seafood, which are facilitated by origin
labeling. Consumers are postulated to differ in the utility they derive from the
consumption of domestic and foreign seafood. We assume that consumers consider
foreign fish to be of lower quality compared to domestic fish. This assumption that
consumers perceive domestic fish to be of higher quality than imported fish is reinforced
by a) recent safety incidents with imported products, b) media reports on fish farming
practices in developing countries and the ineffective inspection of imports, and c)
presentations in popular magazine and newspaper articles of the healthy seafood guide,
which informs consumers to avoid most imported fish (www.edf.org/seafood).1
Wimberley et al. (2003) found that 80 percent of U.S. consumers believe that food
produced or raised in the United States is fresher and safer than imported food.
MCOOL law is a retail labeling program, which brings us to the question of
mandatory labeling in the foodservice sector. The absence of labeling (mandatory or
voluntary) may result in an information problem between consumers and sellers. More
specifically, in the foodservice market, consumers are not informed of the origin of
seafood that sellers know about.2 This information deficit may lead consumers to make
choices they would not have made with full information. We assume as in Lusk et al.
(2006), that country of origin is often associated with product quality. Like nutritional
1

However, it is not always the case that imported seafood is of lower perceived quality than domestic
seafood. For example, Mexican shrimp is considered to have superior flavor and texture over domestic or
other imported shrimp (Cavanaugh, 2003).
2

It is reasonable to expect sellers (in this case foodservice operators) are aware of the origin of fish and
shellfish. They are better informed about the ingredients used in prepared meals, proportions in which they
are mixed, and the cooking methods used.
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attributes, quality is a credence attribute that implies consumers cannot learn about the
characteristics of a product readily through inspection or even after consumption (Nelson
1970; Darby and Karni 1973). However, a credence attribute can be transformed into a
search attribute. With COOL, quality becomes a search attribute because the label
provides information about seafood products that may affect the consumers’ perception
and evaluation of its quality.
In markets where sellers are better informed about product quality (or origin in
our case) than consumers, and when consumers may have perceptions of the risk and
hazards of consuming products from certain countries, the key factor in determining
whether markets for higher quality attributes operate effectively is the success of quality
signaling (e.g., labeling, advertising, warranties) by sellers to consumers (Caswell and
Mojduszka, 1996). Several theoretical and empirical studies on quality-signaling models
explore how communication (voluntary and mandatory) between sellers and consumers
takes place.3 For example, Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” model provides the classic
argument for how asymmetric information may hinder markets. In this model, quality
cannot be signaled. As a result a market may not exist or only the lowest-quality product
may be sold.
On the other hand, voluntary communication addressed by Grossman’s (1981)
“unfolding model” predicts a market exists for varying levels of quality when quality
signaling is totally effective, costless, and truthful, and consumers can costlessly verify
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A literature on informational unraveling suggests that voluntary and mandatory disclosure yield the same
outcome, as long as the information is verifiable with zero cost, as first studied by Grossman (1981) and
Milgrom (1981). Voluntary disclosure leads to only partial unraveling of information is shown by
Jovanovic (1982), Farrell (1986), Fishman and Hagerty (2003), and Jin (2003). Jin (2003) and Mathios
(2000) show empirical investigations of informational unraveling.
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quality after their purchases. Spence’s (1977) “signaling theory” argues that some sellers
may voluntarily try to reduce asymmetric information by sending signals to consumers.
Warranties are often considered a common type of signal sent by “high quality” firms to
reduce the consumers’ information gap on the quality of their products. Thus, voluntary
labeling works well if enough consumers know the value of a product characteristic, if
producers have a credible method of labeling their products, and if consumers are
skeptical of firms that do not label their products.
In contrast, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) develop a model in which a subset of
consumers does not either comprehend disclosure or understand the importance of the
undisclosed attribute. Also, Mathios (2000) found that in the market for salad dressings
there is less than perfect unraveling of information, meaning some of the firms with
dressings in the middle range of the fat distribution chose not to disclose, and some of the
worst chose to disclose.
These models indicate that mandatory labeling may have an impact on product
choices. Mandatory disclosures in contrast to voluntary disclosures make it practicable
for consumers to judge quality before purchasing a product by establishing a quality
scale, requiring testing of quality, and mandating a reporting format. Caswell and
Mojduszka (1996) state that the presence of imperfect information, transaction costs in
acquiring and using information and externalities may make private markets for quality
work inefficiently. Thus, quality signaling through mandatory product labeling and
information disclosure requirements encourages market incentives with relatively limited
government involvement.
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Information about food quality may have public good characteristics. Information
is an economic good that markets do not always create and disseminate efficiently, as
they would handle other kinds of goods and services. The government can step in to
provide information that private markets may not provide when that information is
needed by individuals to make better personal decisions. In this case, food quality (origin
in our case) may be over- or undersupplied and government often intervenes in an
attempt to correct or mitigate imperfections. Mandatory labeling of origin has been in
practice in some states of the United States where products from other countries must be
labeled according to their origin whereas domestic products are not labeled. For example,
Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana have origin labeling requirements for
certain seafood products. However voluntary state and regional labeling has also been
implemented in the United States. Some products sold in grocery stores are identified
with the area of production in the United States. Some examples are: Washington apples,
Vermont maple syrup, Mississippi farm-raised catfish, Alaskan salmon, Georgia Vidalia
onions, Idaho potatoes, and Jersey fresh produce.4
The fact that some retailers already label seafood as to its source indicates that
market participants will provide country of origin information in response to market
demand. This suggests there is no compelling market failure argument regarding
MCOOL implementation. This stems from a lack of evidence of barriers to private
provision of voluntary COOL should consumer demand support the increased costs of
such labeling. To analyze the question of market failure warranting MCOOL law
4

State and regional labeling programs, such as “Washington Apples,” “Idaho potatoes,” and “California
Grown” do not meet the law requirement and so cannot be used in lieu of COOL (USDA-AMS, 2004).
Here we consider such labeling programs as Voluntary COOL.
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implementation, we consider consumer and total welfare under alternate scenarios such
as voluntary labeling, no labeling, and total labeling to compare with partial MCOOL.
While no one has specifically studied the economic impacts of partial coverage of
the MCOOL law, others have noted that advantage may be taken of loopholes. For
example, in their study of the consequences of COOL in the pork industry, Iqbal, Kim,
and Rude (2006) write “(...) if U.S. retailers chose not to incur the extra costs of stocking
Canadian pork, there are alternative outlets for Canadian pork including processed
products and the HRI trade (p. 19).”5 Similarly, USDA-AMS (2004) states “(…) the
majority of the sales of the covered commodity are through channels not affected by this
rule, which provides substantial marketing opportunities for products without verifiable
country of origin claims.” Another example is Tim Hammonds (2003), the president of
the Food Marketing Institute (FMI), who says “(…) ranchers unable to document the
history of their animals will find themselves unable to sell to supermarkets forcing their
beef into the export or foodservice sectors, which are not covered under COOL
regulation.”
Discussion on the implications of MCOOL implementation is not novel. Krissoff
et al (2004) examined in detail the economic rationale behind the various claims about
the effects of mandatory country-of-origin labeling on the beef, pork, and fruits and
vegetables industries. The assumptions and findings are influenced heavily by the nature
and structure of these markets. Other implications have been outlined in discussing the
effects of MCOOL implementation by Peel (2008), Meyer (2008), and VanSickle (2008)
for the beef, pork, and fruits and vegetables industries respectively. To date there is no
5

HRI trade refers to Hotel, Restaurant, and Institutional trade.
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comprehensive report on the partial implementation of MCOOL law for the seafood
industry. The seafood industry is very different from the meat industry as most seafood
consumed in the United States is imported from developing countries while meat
consumed in United States is mostly domestic.
This work is therefore a step towards analyzing the effect of partial MCOOL
policy in the seafood industry taking into consideration the nature of the industry. The
contributions of this paper are its distinct focus on the economic impacts of partial
coverage of MCOOL in the seafood industry on consumers and sellers, and the question
of market failure warranting MCOOL implementation in the United States. This paper
also accounts for imperfect competition among retailers and the foodservice sectors, and
models consumer heterogeneity characterized by different preferences for quality. A
related work is USDA-AMS (2004), which is a detailed study of MCOOL in the seafood
industry. Using a CGE model, the study determines costs incurred in the supply chain as
a result of this regulation. It assumes that retailers are perfectly competitive and that
COOL does not result in increased consumer demand for domestic products. Plastina and
Giannakas (2007) account for imperfect competition among retailers for specialty crops,
and consider consumer and producer heterogeneity in determining the welfare effects on
supply chain participants when COOL is implemented. Their model assumes total
implementation of COOL.
The Model
The model builds on Zago and Pick (2004) who analyze the welfare impact of
labeling policies on agricultural commodities with credence attributes. Our analysis
considers two scenarios, namely, the absence of MCOOL in the market and the presence
9

of MCOOL law implementation. In the absence of MCOOL law implementation, we
consider two cases. In the first case, there is no labeling and the origin of seafood cannot
be distinguished by consumers. Consequently, quality based on origin cannot be
ascertained (product appears undifferentiated to consumers), resulting in imperfect and
asymmetric information. While consumers are unable to differentiate domestic fish from
foreign, we assume that sellers in retail and foodservice sectors can differentiate them.
The other case is voluntarily labeling of domestic seafood in the retail sector. We study
this case to consider fish such as salmon, which was labeled prior to the implementation
of the law. This case will also help us determine under which circumstances retailers
would choose to voluntarily label.
In the presence of MCOOL law implementation, however, the sectors are
segmented with quality differentiation generating a higher price for domestic than foreign
fish.6 Retail and foodservice establishments that implement COOL can now exercise
second-degree price discrimination, where consumers self-select themselves by choosing
between two price-quality bundles. Thus, the sectors with MCOOL implementation are
segmented into low- and high-quality markets. Two cases are considered in the presence
of MCOOL law implementation for welfare implications: current partial MCOOL
implementation (retail sector labeled) and total MCOOL implementation (both retail and
foodservice sectors labeled).
The seafood supply chain is characterized by fish farmers (harvesters/producers),
intermediaries (processors, importers, wholesalers and handlers) and retailers/foodservice
6

Assuming that minimum average cost of production is greater for high quality than for low quality, it
follows that market equilibrium prices p H and pL satisfy the condition pH  pL (Antle, 2001).
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establishments. For simplicity we consider two levels: firms and establishments; where
firms include fish farmers and intermediaries, and establishments are defined as
retailers/foodservice establishments. Firms are further classified as foreign and domestic
based on the origin of seafood supplied. In this model, domestic and foreign firms
supplying seafood are considered to be perfectly competitive. Following previous
literature (Sexton et al., 2003; Richards and Patterson, 2003), we assume retail and
foodservice establishments exercise market power over consumers.
We consider a one-period game under vertical differentiation, with two qualities
for a single good. The domestic country is the United States and the foreign country is the
major exporter of seafood to the United States. We assume the quality, k , of seafood is
exogenous. The quality of seafood products is defined here to depend on location and
conditions of catch or aquaculture, processing, and handling throughout the supply chain
(Caswell, 2006). In keeping with the assumption that the domestic seafood industry is
regulated by the government with stricter policies, and the foreign seafood industry has to
follow certain standards, but may not be subjected to stringent enforcement, the domestic
firm produces high-quality seafood and the foreign firm produces products that are
assumed to be of lower quality or are at least perceived as such. Thus, quality can be
either low ( k L ) or high ( k H ). Domestic and foreign firms produce seafood with different
production technologies and costs of production. Parameters cL and cH reflect
production costs for the two qualities such that c L  c H . That is, foreign fish can be
produced (and sold) at a lower price than domestic fish.
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Supply side
Following Zago and Pick (2004) and Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998), we
assume each firm j (supplier of seafood to retail/foodservice), where j  1 to n ,

maximizes its profit  ij , and produces a quantity qij    of the type i  L, H where i
represents quality. The aggregate supply qi  Qi ( wi ) is the summation of individual
supply qij for each quality i . wi is the market price of selling seafood to the retail or
foodservice sector. The overall surplus of the firms,  i , is the sum of individual profits

 ij . The analytical expression of surplus for firms of quality i seafood is:7
(1)

 ij  qij wi  0.5ci (qij ) 2

We consider a quadratic cost function, i.e., cost increases at an increasing rate and there
is no decreasing marginal costs. This way, the law of diminishing marginal returns is
followed. The expression for aggregate supply function is given as:
(2)

Qi ( wi )  wi / ci

Demand side
To analyze consumer welfare, consider a conceptual model of heterogeneous
consumers. The model is a variant of the classic model of vertical product differentiation
by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and explicitly accounts for differences in consumer attitudes
towards quality of fish. There is a continuum of consumers indexed by their preference 

7

The first order conditions imply

 ij
qij

n

 ij

j 1

qij

0
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n

 0 : wi  ci  qij  0  wi  ci Qi  0 .
j 1

(or willingness to pay) for fish quality, which is uniformly distributed over [0,  ] with

density 1 /  .8 We assume that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good with
quality k . The associated utility is:
(3)

U  k  p

where p is the price of the good of quality k . Aggregate demand depends on
consumers’ beliefs about the quality, i.e., consumers’ information about the origin of
seafood available in the market. Without COOL, consumers believe they are consuming
seafood of expected quality k while with COOL, consumers relate origin information of
seafood to their perceived quality, denoted by k H and k L . This assumption follows Lusk
et al. (2006) who write “…consumers will make an assumption about the average quality
of the product on the market. Because the market will contain products from a variety of
origins, the expected quality of the product on the market might fall well below the
perceived quality of the domestic product (p. 286).” We assume that with asymmetric
information in the non-labeled market, consumers evaluate seafood quality using a simple
average: k  (k H  k L ) 2 .
Pre-MCOOL: No Labeling

In the absence of MCOOL law implementation (no labeling), origin and
production method cannot be determined by the consumers. That is, there is imperfect
information in the market. Further, there is asymmetric information as sellers are aware
of the origin and production of fish while consumers cannot identify them. In the extreme

8

It should be noted that as the lower bound of the taste distribution is equal to zero, the market will not be
entirely covered, i.e., some consumers prefer not to buy the good offered.
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case, if a consumer has no information about the quality of the product, sellers will resort
to selling the lowest possible quality of a good.
We make the assumption that in the absence of labeling, the retail and foodservice
sectors sell only foreign seafood because, in the context of this model, they do not have
an incentive to sell domestic seafood.9 Figure 1 panel a shows schematically the seafood
market in the absence of MCOOL law implementation.
The retail and foodservice sectors are considered two separate markets. We
consider two separate markets because with the implementation of MCOOL the
foodservice sector is “exempt” from labeling. In both markets, consumers are
heterogeneous in their preference for quality and are postulated to differ in the utility or
marginal willingness to pay that they derive from the quality of seafood. We assume that
consumers have the same valuation for quality in the two markets. A unique price p
develops in both sectors and consumers have an expected quality k as mentioned above.
The conditional indirect utility function of a consumer with preference parameter
θ in the retail and foodservice market is given by:

9

The framework considered here implies that consumers do not know the actual quality of seafood
supplied and would consume foreign seafood in the absence of labeling because there is also uncertainty
about the extent to which it is potentially unsafe for their health. However, when information is available
about the origin of seafood, some consumers are willing to pay more for domestic seafood.
In the absence of information regarding the origin of seafood, domestic and foreign fish are marketed
together and the price received by establishments is the same regardless of which product is produced
(pooling equilibrium; see Akerlof 1970). The absence of a premium for domestic seafood when they are not
segregated, coupled with increased costs of producing domestic seafood, result in the profitability of the
domestic fish being lower than that of foreign fish. In this case the supply of domestic seafood is not
incentive compatible; market forces lead to failure of the market to satisfy expressed consumer demands.
Hence, only foreign seafood is sold in the non-labeled sector.
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(4)

 k  p
U 
0

if consumes a unit of seafood of expected quality k at price p
if consumes nothing

The indifferent consumer between consuming a unit of seafood and not
consuming can be characterized as:
(5)

0 

p
k

Consumers with valuation for quality greater than  0 will buy seafood and
consumers with valuation for quality lower than  0 will not buy seafood. Thus, the
demand for seafood in a market with no differentiation can be found by aggregating the
quantity consumed by consumers with  >  0 . Normalizing   1 , the demand at retail
or foodservice with no labeling corresponds to:
(6)

D0 ( p )  1 

p
k

To determine the equilibrium quantity and price in the absence of MCOOL
implementation, we solve the profit-maximization function for the retail and foodservice
sectors. Then, derived demands at the retail and foodservice levels are equated with the
supply of foreign firms. The two sectors are each characterized by N identical retailers
and N identical foodservice establishments competing with each other and who have
market power over consumers. The individual retailer/foodservice establishment m
(m  1,..., N ) maximizes profit given by:
(7)

max  mNC  [ p (Q0 )  wL ] q 0 m
q0 m

15

where p (Q0 )  k (1  Q0 ) is the inverse demand for non-labeled seafood in retail or
foodservice. wL represents the price of foreign seafood paid by retailers and foodservice
establishments to foreign firms.10 The superscript NC refers to the scenario with no
labeling. The first-order conditions of (7) imply:
(8)

where

 mNC
 0  k 1  Q0 1   m   wL
q 0 m

m 

Q0 q 0 m
q 0 m Q0

represent

the

retailer/foodservice establishment m .

conjectural

variation

elasticity

of

the

Because we assume identical retailers and

foodservice establishments, each firm’s conjectural variation elasticity is identical in
equilibrium, i.e., 1   2  ....   m   . In this context, the firm’s individual first-order
condition corresponds to the aggregate first-order condition, i.e.,
(9)

k (1  Q0 (1   ))  wL

Equation (9) represents the aggregate derived demand facing foreign firms from the retail
or the foodservice sector.
When the parameter   [0, 1] is zero, it implies the establishments have no
market power, while   1 implies perfect collusion.
Equating derived demand (9) facing the foreign firms, aggregated over retail and
foodservice establishments, with supply (2) indicates the following:
(10)

2(k  wL )
k



wL
cL

10

We assume the retail and foodservice sector incur the same costs of purchasing foreign seafood and other
costs are assumed to be zero for simplicity.
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where   (1   ) . Solving for wL gives the equilibrium quantities and prices:
(11)

wL* 

(12)

Q0* 

(13)

p 

*

2k c L
k   2c L

k
k  2c L
( k   2c L ) k
k   2c L

The superscript notation * refers to equilibrium. Welfare measures with no labeling can
be considered as a benchmark when evaluating the effects of MCOOL implementation.
Using (13), consumers’ surplus with no labeling (indexed by NC) can be
calculated by integrating consumer utility at equilibrium for consumers who consume a
unit of seafood with willingness to pay for quality greater than  0 in foodservice/retail:
3

1

(14)

CS

NC

k
  ( k  p )d 
2( k   2c L ) 2
0
*

Equation (14) is used to aggregate consumer surplus in the two sectors to get expected
consumer welfare:
3

(15)

CS

NC

k

(k  2c L ) 2

Equation (15) shows that consumer welfare depends positively on the expected quality of
seafood and negatively on the costs of producing low-quality fish and the market power
of establishments.
For the purpose of welfare analysis of MCOOL implementation, we also compute
real consumer surplus. Real consumer surplus considers that while consumers believe
17

seafood is of quality k , it is in fact k L . The aggregate real consumer surplus for the same
set of consumers and prices in equilibrium as before is given as:
1

(16)

NC
CS real
  ( k L  p )d 
*

k (k k L  k (k   2c L ))

0

(k  2c L ) 2

where k  k H  k L . Under real consumer surplus, both the price and the indifferent
consumer between buying or not is determined according to the value of the quality
actually consumed k L .
Profit earned by retail and foodservice sectors can be calculated by substituting
prices and quantities in equation (7) with equilibrium prices and quantities. The
expression for total profit aggregated over retail and foodservice sectors is given as:
3

(17)



NC

2k 

(k  2c L ) 2

Equation (17) shows that profit depends positively on the expected quality of seafood and
market power parameter, and negatively on the costs of producing low-quality fish. Total
welfare is the summation of real consumer surplus and profit which is:
3

(18)

TW

NC



k (k k L  k (k   2c L ))  2k 
(k  2c L ) 2

Pre-MCOOL: Voluntary COOL at Retail

Prior to the implementation of MCOOL, some retailers may have voluntarily
disclosed origin information for domestic seafood and may have chosen not to provide
information about foreign seafood whose value to consumers may be less than its
associated disclosure cost. Disclosing information about domestic seafood may be
18

especially valuable when consumers have a strong willingness to pay for domestic
seafood. The retailer can then segment the market and implement profitable second
degree price discrimination. We examine this case as an alternative benchmark scenario.
In this case the retail sector will differentiate domestic seafood (identified by
labels) from foreign seafood. In the retail sector domestic seafood is indexed by quality
k H whereas non-labeled seafood is indexed by quality k . In the absence of labels

consumers cannot identify the origin of seafood and perceive it to be of average quality.
Perceived quality k H is greater than average quality k and corresponding prices for
seafood at retail are pH and p with p H  p .
Again let us consider two firms, domestic and foreign, selling to two sectors:
retail and foodservice. We assume all domestic seafood is supplied to retail because it is
labeled and foreign seafood is supplied to both the foodservice (non-labeled sector) and
the retail sector, where it is not labeled. A schematic representation of this case is shown
in Figure 1 panel b.
As in the previous model, there is a continuum of consumers with preference 
for quality. With voluntary labeling facilitating differentiation of domestic from foreign
seafood in the retail sector, the indirect utility of a consumer is given by:
(19)
 k H  p H

U   k  p
0


if consumes a unit of domestic seafood in retail sector
if consumes a unit of seafood of expected quality in retail sector
if consumes nothing

Similarly, in the foodservice sector it is:

19

(20)
 k  p
U 
0

if consumes a unit of seafood of expected quality in foodservice sector
if consumes nothing

where k  k H . There are two indifferent consumers in the retail sector: one is
indifferent between consuming domestic seafood and non-labeled seafood ( H ) , and one
between consuming non-labeled seafood and not consuming at all ( 0 ) . Similarly, in the
foodservice sector, consumers are indifferent between consuming non-labeled seafood
and not consuming at all (  0 ). Accordingly, the indifferent consumers (using 19 and 20)
and the demand for each quality of seafood can be found by aggregating the quantity
consumed of each type in the two sectors and are given at retail by:
(21)

H 

0 

pH  p
kH  k

p
k

DH ( p H , p)  1 
D0 ( p H , p ) 

pH  p
kH  k

pH  p
kH  k



p
k

where DH and D0 are demand for domestic and non-labeled seafood in the retail sector.
In foodservice, they are given by:
(22)

0 

p
k

D0 ( p)  1 

p
k

where D0 is demand for non-labeled seafood in the foodservice sector.
Voluntary labeling entails costs to retailers and domestic firms. Domestic fish
producers and harvesters incur the cost of establishing and maintaining a recordkeeping
system for origin and production information, and for product identification, labor, and
training. Consequently retailers need to incur costs associated with labeling domestic
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seafood. The cost of labeling/recordkeeping borne by retailers is denoted as b and
operating costs (segregation and identity preservation costs) are denoted as y.
To determine equilibrium quantity and price, the profit-maximization function for
the individual retailer and foodservice is solved first as each retailer m maximizes its
profit given by:
(23)
where

max  VC
rm  [ p H (Q H , Q0 )  w H  b] q H m  [ p (Q H , Q0 )  w L ] q 0 m

q H m , q0 m

p H (QH , Q0 )  k H  k H QH  k Q0

and

p (QH , Q0 )  k (1  QH  Q0 ) .

The

superscript VC refers to a scenario with voluntary labeling at retail. The first-order
conditions of (23) imply:
(24)

k H  k H Q H  H  k Q0  H  w H  b
k (1  Q0 0  QH 0 )  wL

where  H  (1   H ) and  H 

Qi q H
Qi q 0
. Similarly 0  (1   0 ) and  0 
. Here
q H Qi
q 0 Qi

Qi can be QH or Q0 . Assume  H   0   , therefore  H  0   . Equation (24)
represents the derived demand facing domestic and foreign firms in the retail sector after
solving simultaneously for Q H and Q0 . Each foodservice establishment m maximizes its
profit given by:
(25)

max  VC
fm  [ p (Q0 )  w L ] q 0 m
q0 m

where p (Q0 )  k (1  Q0 ) is the inverse demand for seafood in the foodservice sector.
The first-order conditions of (25) imply:
(26)

k (1  Q0  )  wL
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where   (1   ) and  

Q0 q 0
. Equation (26) represents the derived demand facing
q 0 Q0

foreign firms in the foodservice sector.
With voluntary labeling, two markets emerge: one for high-quality and the other
for low-quality seafood. Domestic firms supplying high-quality seafood incur an
additional cost y while the foreign firms’ supply function for low-quality seafood remains
unchanged. Following equations (1) and (2), supply in the two markets can be written as:
(27)

QH  wH /(c H  y )
Q0  w L / c L
Equating aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (24 and

26) with supply of domestic and foreign firms (27) indicates the following:

(28)

wH
k  2( wH  wL  b)

cH  y
k 
k  wL
k



2k ( wH  b)  2k H wL

k k 



wL
cL

Using (28), equilibrium quantities and prices in the two sectors, and prices of
domestic and foreign firms can be derived. Consumers’ surplus in the retail and
foodservice sectors, identified by subscript r for retail and f for foodservice are given as:
H

1

CS rVC   ( k  p ) d   ( k H  p H* ) d

(29)

*

0
1

H

CS VC
  ( k  p ) d
f
*

0

The expected consumer surplus with voluntary labeling is obtained by
aggregating consumer surplus in the retail and foodservice sector. Similar to our previous

22

argument, real consumer surplus in retail and foodservice can be derived by substituting

real quality supplied in the non-labeled market k L in place of k .
Profit can be calculated by substituting prices and quantities in equation (23 and
25) with equilibrium prices and quantities. Total welfare is expressed as the summation
of real consumer surplus and profit.
Expressions for equation (29), for profit, and for total welfare are messy and
complicated for doing analysis through comparative statics, so analysis is done using
numerical simulations. Numerical simulation details can be found in the analysis section.
Partial MCOOL: MCOOL Implementation in Retail

The current U.S. regulation requires MCOOL in the retail sector, so consumers
can distinguish between the domestic and foreign seafood indexed by quality k H and k L
respectively in the model. Domestic seafood is assumed to be perceived to be of higher
quality than foreign seafood, i.e., k H  k L , and corresponding prices for seafood at retail
are pH and pL with pH  pL . We assume domestic seafood (higher quality) is supplied
to retail because it is identifiable through labels. Foreign seafood (lower quality) is
supplied to both the non-labeled foodservice sector and the labeled retail sector, where it
is labeled as such. Retailers can now convey product quality information to consumers
via origin labels and a separating equilibrium may be attained that efficiently sorts
consumers into markets for different qualities with corresponding prices. However, in the
foodservice sector, in the absence of labeling, only foreign seafood is supplied (see
footnote 9). Figure 1 panel c shows how MCOOL facilitates quality differentiation at
retail.
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The indirect utility of a consumer in the retail and foodservice sectors in this case
is given as:

(30)

 k H  p H if consumes a unit of domestic seafood in labeled (retail) sector

U   k L  p L if consumes a unit of foreign seafood in labeled (retail) sector
0
if consumes nothing


Similarly,
(31)

 k  p
U 
0

if consumes a unit of foreign seafood in non - labeled sector
if consumes nothing

where k L  k  k H . Using (30) the indifferent consumers and the demand for each
quality ( H , L ) of seafood in retail are given by:
pH  pL
kH  kL
p
 L
kL

 HL 
(32)

 L0

pH  pL
kH  kL
p  pL pL
DL ( pH , pL )  H

kH  kL kL

DH ( pH , pL )  1 

Using (31), the indifferent consumer and demand for non-labeled seafood are given by
the following equations in the foodservice sector:
(33)

0 

p
k

D0 ( p )  1 

p
k

As mentioned earlier there are costs associated with MCOOL implementation.
MCOOL requires systems to be implemented to ensure that origin and production
information is transferred from producers to the next buyers of their products, and that
the information is maintained for the required amount of time. With MCOOL
implementation in retail, domestic firms bear operating costs (segregation and identity
preservation costs) y whereas foreign firms do not. Exporters are assumed to not bear
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operating costs with MCOOL because they inform the country of origin with labels to the
“ultimate purchaser” anyway, irrespective of MCOOL implementation. Ultimate
purchaser has been defined as the last U.S. person who will receive the product in the
form in which it was imported. Similar to the voluntary labeling scenario, retailers incur
costs of labeling b. However, this cost applies to all seafood sold in retail, which includes
domestic and foreign seafood.
Each retailer m maximizes its profit given by:
(34)

max  rPC  [ p H (QH , QL )  wH  b] q H m  [ p L (QH , QL )  wL  b] q L m

q Hm , q Lm

where p H (QH , QL )  k H  k H QH  k L QL and p L (QH , QL )  k L 1  QH  QL  are the
inverse demand for domestic and foreign seafood at retail. The first-order conditions of
(34) imply:
(35)

k H  k H Q H   k L Q L   wH  b
k L (1  QL   QH  )  wL  b

Equation (35) represents the derived demand facing domestic and foreign firms in the
retail sector after solving simultaneously for QH and QL .
Each foodservice establishment m maximizes its profit given by:
(36)

max  PC
 [ p (Q0 )  wL ] q 0 m
f
q0 m

where p (Q0 )  k (1  Q0 ) is the inverse demand for seafood in the foodservice sector.
The superscript PC refers to a scenario with partial MCOOL implementation. The firstorder conditions of (36) imply:
(37)

k (1  Q0  )  wL
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The above equation represents the derived demand facing foreign firms in the foodservice
sector.
Supply in the high- and low-quality markets can be written as:
(38)

QH ( wH )  wH /(cH  y )
QL ( wL )  wL / cL
Equating aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (35 and

37) with supply of domestic and foreign firms (38) indicates the following:

(39)

k  ( wH  wL )
wH

k 
cH  y
k  wL
k

k L ( wH  b)  k H ( wL  b) wL

k L k 
cL



Consumers’ surplus in the retail and foodservice sectors for this case are given as:
CS rPC 

(40)

 HL

*
 ( k L  p L ) d 

L0
1

1

 ( k

H

 p H* ) d

HL

CS PC
  ( k  p ) d
f
*

0

The expected consumer welfare after implementing MCOOL is obtained by
aggregating consumer surplus in the retail and foodservice sector. The expressions for
real consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare are derived as before. The expressions are
not reported here but analyzed using numerical simulations in the analysis section.
Total MCOOL: MCOOL Implementation in Retail and Foodservice

Finally, we consider the case where MCOOL is implemented in both the retail
and foodservice sectors. There is no informational asymmetry, consumers are able to
determine the origin of seafood and make informed choices in both sectors. An important
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outcome of uniform regulation in both sectors is that there is no scope for diversion.
Figure 1 panel d shows the case of a totally differentiated market. Here, labeling cost b is
applicable to both the foodservice and retail establishments. As before, cost y is borne
only by the domestic firms. The profit-maximization equation for the individual
retailer/foodservice establishment m becomes:
(41)

max  TC
m  [ p H (Q H , Q L )  w H  b] q H m  [ p L (Q H , Q L )  w L  b] q L m

q Hm , q Lm

where p H (QH , QL )  k H  k H QH  k L QL and p L (QH , QL )  k L 1  QH  QL  are the
inverse demand for domestic and foreign seafood in retail or foodservice. The superscript
TC refers to a scenario with total MCOOL implementation. All other variables are as
previously defined. The first order conditions of (41) imply:
(42)

k H  k H Q H   k L Q L   wH  b
k L (1  QL   QH  )  wL  b
The above equations can be solved for Q H and QL to get the derived demand

facing domestic and foreign firms in the retail and foodservice sectors. Equating
aggregate derived demand of the retail and foodservice sectors (42) with supply of the
domestic and foreign firms (38) indicates the following:

(43)

2(k  ( wH  wL ))
wH

k 
cH  y
2(k L wH  k H wL ) wL

k L k 
cL
Consumer surplus at the retail or foodservice sector when both sectors are labeled

is given by:
(44)
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Expected consumer surplus is the same as real consumer surplus in a totally
differentiated market as there is no mismatch between quality of seafood supplied and
consumed.
Analysis

In this section, we examine the extent to which diversion occurs as a result of
partial MCOOL implementation and the associated welfare effects. Diversion can be
related to the concept of ‘leakage’ in the emissions leakage literature. Leakage refers to
increases in production and associated emissions among unregulated producers that occur
as a direct consequence of incomplete environmental regulation (CCAP, 2005; and
RGGI, 2007). Fowlie (2009) states that when there is incomplete regulation, i.e., when
pollution regulation is applied to only a subset of firms in a polluting industry, substantial
leakage may occur since production at regulated firms can be substituted for unregulated
production. Similarly, the partial implementation of MCOOL may lead to diversion or
leakage of lower quality imports to the non-labeled sector. We define diversion as a
percentage of the relative share of foreign seafood increase in the foodservice sector with
partial implementation of MCOOL.
In our analysis, we consider the pre-MCOOL case (no labeling and voluntary
labeling) as the benchmark to determine the effect of MCOOL (partial and total
implementation) on welfare. Our welfare analysis focuses on consumer surplus (expected
and real), profit, and total welfare (consumer surplus and profit).
Using Mathematica 6.0, we first calibrate the model to have positive prices and
quantities in equilibrium. To calibrate the model, we normalize c L and k L  1 , fix  =
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0.5, set costs associated with labeling b  0.07 and y  0.0025 , and then determine
values for c H and k H in the feasible region (positive prices and quantities in
equilibrium). In order to analyze the effect of change in quality on welfare and diversion
within the feasible region, we fix cH at 4 and vary k H from 110% to 210% of k L . We
allow k H to have differences in quality from 10% to 100%. Finally, we vary labeling
costs b from 0.05 to 0.15 for k H = 1.1 and 2 to analyze the incentive for retailers to
voluntarily label domestic seafood as opposed to not label at all, by comparing profits
across four scenarios – No Labeling, Voluntary COOL, Partial MCOOL, and Total
MCOOL. All other parameters are set at the values mentioned above.
Table 1 summarizes welfare magnitudes for fixed parameter values for the four
scenarios considered. The “high quality” parameter k H is set at 1.5, and market power
parameter  is set at 0.5, b is set at 0.07, all other parameters are set at values mentioned
earlier.
The first two rows of Table 1 show the comparative magnitude of consumer
surplus (expected and real) across four scenarios, namely, no labeling, voluntary COOL,
partial MCOOL, and total MCOOL. For fixed parameter values, expected consumer
surplus is greatest with partial MCOOL and real consumer surplus is greatest with total
MCOOL. Expected consumer welfare in the partial MCOOL case does not take into
account the real quality k L of foreign fish supplied to consumers in the non-labeled
sector. Rather it is based on consumers’ belief of quality k , where k > k L . Thus, while
consumers expect to be getting quality k , they are in fact consuming seafood of
perceived lower quality. Because consumer utility is dependent on the quality of the
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product consumed, consumer surplus is necessarily higher when consumers believe they
are getting k rather than k L . Considering that consumers are truly consuming quality k L ,
real consumer surplus is greatest with total MCOOL. When both sectors are labeled,
expected quality is equal to real quality, and consumers are aware of the quality of fish
they consume and can make informed choices.
Real consumer surplus is greater under voluntary COOL than partial MCOOL
because the quantity of perceived expected-quality fish consumed in retail, in the
voluntary COOL scenario, is greater than the quantity of perceived low-quality fish
consumed in retail under partial MCOOL. Equilibrium quantity comparisons for fixed
parameter values under the two scenarios can be seen in Table 2.
Profit is greatest under voluntary labeling followed by partial MCOOL, No
labeling, and total MCOOL as shown in Table 1. A non-labeled market can lead sellers to
take advantage of consumer misinformation. The absence of labels allows sellers to
masquerade sales of low-quality fish as higher quality. As a result, consumers pay a
higher price for low-quality seafood, which increases profit for establishments selling
low-quality fish in the non-labeled market. Under voluntary labeling, retailers label
domestic fish but not foreign fish. However, under partial MCOOL, retailers must label
all fish. Thus, under voluntary COOL retailers take advantage of consumers’ willingnessto-pay for domestic fish and their ignorance of quality of the foreign fish. This is
reflected in equilibrium with the higher price-quality ratio for low-quality fish sold in
both the retail and foodservice sectors under voluntary labeling compared to partial
MCOOL. This leads to greater profit under voluntary COOL scenario.
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Table 1 shows that total welfare is greatest under voluntary COOL, followed by
partial MCOOL, total MCOOL, and No labeling. The ranking follows that of profit,
meaning that the profit component in total welfare dominates the effect of real consumer
surplus.
a.

Diversion and the effect of quality on diversion

We examine the effect of partial MCOOL on the quantity of low-quality fish
diverted to the non-labeled market. We focus on the foodservice sector for our
calculations of diversion because it is exempt under current MCOOL law. Before
MCOOL implementation, neither retail nor foodservice sectors were required to be
labeled. As a result there is no potential for diversion. However, with MCOOL
implemented in the retail sector, low-quality fish may be diverted to the non-labeled
sector. One way to measure diversion to the non-labeled market is to compare the
quantity of low-quality fish sold to the foodservice sector (non-labeled) prior to partial
MCOOL implementation, i.e., Q0* NC , with the quantity sold under partial MCOOL, i.e.,
Q0*PC . Substituting parameter values, the quantity sold to the foodservice sector before
partial MCOOL is smaller than under implementation of the law. This would indicate
diversion of low-quality fish to the non-labeled market. However, this measure may be
misleading because it is possible that the total quantity of fish sold in the U.S. market
(high- and low-quality) increases with the implementation of partial MCOOL. Thus, a
relative measure of diversion is more accurate.
Diversion is measured by comparing the relative quantity of low-quality fish sold
in the foodservice sector under partial implementation of MCOOL to the relative quantity
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sold in the absence of its implementation. The formula used to calculate diversion is
given as:
(45)

diversion % 

* PC
0

Q

Q0*PC
Q* NC
1
Q0* PC
 * NC 0 * NC

* PC
* PC
* PC
Q0  Q0
 QH  QL
Q0  QH* PC  QL* PC 2
*100 
*100
1
Q0* NC
2
Q0* NC  Q0* NC

Diversion is expressed as a percentage of relative share of low-quality fish sold in
foodservice post and pre-MCOOL implementation. A diagrammatic representation is
shown in Figure 2.
We find that at fixed parameter values, there is evidence of diversion as shown in
Figure 3. At the initial parameter value of k H  1.1 , the diversion percentage has a value
of 7.5 percent. This means that the share of low-quality fish in the foodservice sector with
partial MCOOL is relatively larger than the share pre-MCOOL. Under partial MCOOL
the price-quality ratio of seafood in the foodservice sector is lower than with preMCOOL. . Therefore, non-labeled fish from the food service sector under MCOOL is
more attractive to consumers. This can be explained as follows. The pre-MCOOL market
is characterized by the supply of low-quality foreign fish only, which consumers perceive
to be of expected average quality k . With partial MCOOL, high-quality domestic fish is
also supplied to the labeled sector whereas the non-labeled sector behaves similarly to the
pre-MCOOL market. Price competition in the partial MCOOL case between domestic
and foreign seafood results in a lower price for expected quality fish in the non-labeled
sector than in the pre-MCOOL case. Thus, the quantity of low-quality fish sold in the
non-labeled sector after partial MCOOL implementation is greater than pre-MCOOL.
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Refer to Table 2 to compare equilibrium price and quantity across pre- and post-MCOOL
scenarios.
Figure 3 shows that the greater the quality differences between domestic and
foreign fish, the greater will be the diversion to the non-labeled market. The same
intuition as above applies, i.e., this is explained by the larger difference in the pricequality ratio.
b.

Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood
on consumer surplus

Expected consumer surplus increases in all four scenarios with increasing quality
differences between domestic and foreign fish (Figure 4). In contrast, real consumer
surplus increases for total MCOOL, but decreases for partial MCOOL, voluntary
labeling, and No labeling (Figure 5). Real consumer surplus decreases for the No labeling
case as consumers in reality are being supplied with low-quality fish despite their belief
they are consuming fish of expected quality. As k H increases, expected quality ( k )
increases, which increases the price and reduces the quantity of (foreign) fish consumed.
However, the real quality k L does not change with an increase in the quality difference
between domestic and foreign seafood. Thus, real consumer surplus decreases under No
labeling as price-quality ratio increases with no change in real quality, which reduces the
quantity consumed.
Increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood results in
real consumer surplus decreasing under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL. This is
because voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios are characterized by labeled and
non-labeled sectors. The non-labeled sector under these scenarios behaves similarly to the
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No labeling scenario. That is, increase in k H does not change the real quality k L
supplied. Thus, the price-quality ratio under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL
increases in the non-labeled sector with increasing quality differences. Under total
MCOOL implementation, high- and low-quality labeled seafood are sold in both the
sectors. With increasing quality differences, the price-quality ratio of high-quality
seafood sold in retail is lower than the price-quality ratio of high-quality seafood sold
under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios. Similarly, the price-quality ratio
of low-quality seafood sold in retail and foodservice sectors is lower than the ratio of
low-quality seafood sold under voluntary COOL and partial MCOOL scenarios. This
smaller price-quality ratio indicates that real consumer surplus becomes greater under
total MCOOL compared with the other two scenarios.
Figure 5 shows that at low differences in quality between domestic and foreign
fish, real consumer surplus under partial MCOOL is greater than total MCOOL, and
voluntary COOL gives the highest real consumer surplus. This quickly reverses as the
difference in quality between domestic and foreign fish increases. This is because when
the quality difference becomes larger and consumer value quality, labeling allows
consumers to sort qualities and benefit from it.
c.

Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign seafood
on profit and total welfare

The effect of increasing the quality difference on profit is shown in Figure 6. As
k H increases, profit increases. Profit increases the most for scenarios characterized by

non-labeled markets, as the perceived expected quality of fish increases but in reality
low-quality fish is supplied.
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We analyze the effect of varying labeling costs on profit of firms across scenarios
by considering two cases – low difference in quality ( k H  1.1 and k L  1 ) and high
difference in quality ( k H  2 and k L  1 ). These cases are shown in Figure 7a and Figure
7b. Across both cases it can be seen that as cost increases, profit of firms decreases.
Increase in labeling costs does not alter the ranking price-quality ratio for low-quality
seafood across scenarios, i.e., price-quality ratio is higher for voluntary COOL compared
to other scenarios. Thus, profit under voluntary labeling remains the highest. At low
difference in quality (Figure 7a) and low labeling costs, profits are higher under total
MCOOL but reverses as labeling costs increase. No labeling becomes preferable to total
MCOOL with increasing b because firms under No labeling scenario bear no costs
whereas firms under total MCOOL bear costs of labeling both in the retail and
foodservice sectors. Compared with a No labeling scenario, retail sector will voluntarily
label domestic seafood because identification of origin leads domestic firms supply to a
labeled market, consumers are willing to pay for quality, and the benefits of labeling
outweigh the costs, in turn retailers make higher profits.
Total welfare has two components - real consumer surplus and profit. Figure 8
shows that increasing differences in quality between domestic and foreign fish ( k H )
increases total welfare for voluntary labeling, partial MCOOL, and total MCOOL but
decreases total welfare for the No labeling scenario. The increase in total welfare is
explained by the increase in profit with increasing quality differences, as profit
overweighs real consumer surplus in magnitude. In contrast, the decrease in total welfare
is explained by the decrease in real consumer surplus that overweighs profit in magnitude
under No labeling scenario.
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Conclusion

The seafood market in the United States is characterized increasingly by imported
fish and shellfish from developing countries. With the implementation of MCOOL in
April 2005 in the seafood market, and the exemption of the foodservice sector from
mandatory labeling, there is a potential for diversion of lower quality imports to the nonlabeled sector. In other words, while labeling satisfies the market demand for information
provision in one market, exemptions in the other market create incentives for the
diversion of imports, which are assumed to be lower in quality than domestic seafood, to
the non-labeled sector. The diversion of lower quality seafood to the non-labeled market
segment has consequences for the welfare impact of the implementation of partial
MCOOL.
This paper develops a conceptual model of heterogeneous consumers that
examines the consequences of partial MCOOL implementation on welfare and diversion.
Numerical simulation results show that diversion is possible in the partial MCOOL
scenario and the higher the perceived quality of domestic fish, the greater the diversion of
low-quality imports to the non-labeled market. Real consumer surplus is greatest under
total MCOOL implementation when quality differences between domestic and foreign
fish are perceived to be great. However at low differences in quality, voluntary COOL is
preferred to total MCOOL as real consumer surplus is greater under voluntary COOL.
Profit is also greatest under voluntary COOL with both increasing quality differences and
labeling costs.
Our work has several policy implications. If the goal of MCOOL policy is to
provide consumers with information through retail labeling, and if consumers value
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quality (as previous studies have shown), then the likely unintended consequences of
diverting food products into the non-labeled market as a result of partial COOL
implementation need to be considered. This problem is especially important for fish and
seafood as these products are consumed in large part in the foodservice sector—a nonlabeled market. Real consumer welfare and total welfare are greater under voluntary
labeling than under the current partial implementation in retail only suggesting that there
is no evident market failure argument that warrants the imposition of partial MCOOL
law. Based on the goal of the law to provide consumers with information through retail
labeling, and the extent to which consumers perceive the difference in quality, this law
seems to be unnecessary. Some of our results are contingent on the fact that consumers
value and consider domestic seafood to be of significantly higher quality than foreign
seafood. Literature shows there are a number of studies on consumers’ willingness to pay
for origin of food products. Our results support more work on studying consumers’
willingness to pay for domestic seafood. Thus, our study shows that voluntary labeling
can mitigate asymmetric information problems arising from the credence nature of the
origin of seafood products, and enhance consumer welfare.
The current state of the food industry, with numerous recent safety scares and
publicity about safe seafood choices, has contributed to the perception that foreign fish is
of lower quality than domestic fish. The nature of the industry characterized by a
majority of imported seafood consumed away from home poses a real question about the
effectiveness of retail-MCOOL. Though some labeling is perhaps better than none at all,
partial labeling can lead to undermining the effectiveness of the regulation.
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Table 1: Welfare magnitude comparisons for fixed parameter values.
Parameter values: k H  1.5 k L  c L  1 c H  4   0.5 b  0.07
No
Voluntary
Partial
Labeling
COOL
MCOOL
0.130
0.150
0.156
Expected Consumer
Surplus
-0.005
0.104
0.076
Real Consumer
Surplus
0.130
0.171
0.156
Producer Surplus

0.125

Total Welfare

0.275

0.232

y  0.0025
Total
MCOOL
0.113

0.113
0.113
0.225

Table 2: Equilibrium price and quantity comparisons for fixed parameter values.
Parameter values: k H  1.5
Sector

Retail

Foodservice

Equilibrium
price and
quantity
pH , qH
pL , qL
p, q L
pH , qH
pL , qL
p, q L

k L  c L  1 c H  4   0.5 b  0.07

No
Labeling

N/A
N/A
0.847, 0.323
N/A
N/A
0.847, 0.323

Note: N/A refers to not applicable
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y  0.0025

Voluntary
COOL

Partial
MCOOL

Total
MCOOL

0.999, 0.170
N/A
0.792, 0.197
N/A
N/A
0.792, 0.366

1.103, 0.208
0.707, 0.085
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.743, 0.405

1.119, 0.107
0.673, 0.220
N/A
1.119, 0.107
0.673, 0.220
N/A

Figure 1: Market scenarios for COOL implementation
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Figure 2: Diversion under Partial MCOOL
b. Post-MCOOL: Partial MCOOL Implementation
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Q 0* PC

Figure 3: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign
seafood on Diversion percentage under partial MCOOL (  0.5 , c H  4 )
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Figure 4: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign
seafood on Expected consumer surplus (  0.5 , c H  4 )
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Figure 5: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign
seafood on Real consumer surplus (  0.5 , c H  4 )

Figure 6: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign
seafood on Profit (  0.5 , c H  4 )
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Figure 7a: Effect of varying labeling costs on Profits with k H  1.1 ,   0.5 , and
cH  4

Figure 7b: Effect of varying labeling costs on Profits with k H  2 ,   0.5 , and
cH  4
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Figure 8: Effect of increasing quality differences between domestic and foreign
seafood on Total welfare (  0.5 , c H  4 )
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